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Volunteering at the extensive margin: intrinsic or
extrinsic motive?∗
Modeste Dayé†
Abstract
This paper identifies the nature of the predominant motive (consumption versus investment)
moving people to offer labour for free by considering the major beneficiary sectors involved.
Using basic consumption and investment models, some hypotheses are derived and tested
to identify the salient motivation for volunteering in each sector. The analysis results
in two main findings: (a) in peace movements and in women’s groups and associations,
volunteers seem to be mainly intrinsically motivated and (b) in sectors concerned with social
welfare for the elderly people or in religious and health organizations, the key motivation
for volunteering is investment (extrinsic returns).
Keywords: volunteering, intrinsic motive, labour supply.
JEL codes: C13, D11, J22, C26.
Résumé
L’objectif de ce papier est d’identifier la principale motivation (consommation ou investise-
ment) du bénévolat en considérant les principaux secteurs bénéficaires. A cet effet, l’étude
se fonde sur des modèles de consommation et d’investissement desquels sont dérivées dif-
férentes hypothèses qui sont testées. Deux principaux résultats découlent du papier: (a)
le bénévolat dans les mouvements et associations pour le maintien de la paix et dans les
groupements et associations de femmes semble principalement mu par des motifs de con-
sommation (bien-être procuré par la cause défendue) alors que (b) dans les associations
s’occupant du bien-être des personnes âgées, les organisations relevant du secteur de la
santé, et dans les organisations religieuses, les volontaires semblent être beaucoup plus
motivés par les retours sur l’investissement de leur temps.
Mots clés: volontariat, motivations intrinsèques, offre de travail.
Codes JEL : C13, D11, J22, C26.
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1 Introduction
People face two main types of incentive while entering volunteering: some
are categorized as intrinsic motivation and others as extrinsic motivation.
An individual is intrinsically motivated to volunteer if it is internally re-
warding for her to do so. In that vein, volunteering is undertaken for the
sheer joy arising from performing the underlying activities ("warm-glow"
utility, Andreoni (1989)) or for some purely altruistic purposes. Conversely,
if volunteering is mainly driven by some external expected rewards, the mo-
tivation to volunteer is referred to as extrinsic.
The aim of this paper is to analyze the nature of the main incentives
moving people to volunteer by considering different beneficiary sectors.
More specifically, the paper attempts to find out in which major volun-
teering sectors (political parties, religious organizations, social welfare for
the elderly, women’s groups or associations, etc.), motivation is likely to
be mainly intrinsically driven, and which sectors seem rather to attract on
average, volunteers willing to invest in human and social capital (people
motivated by the underlying returns).
Analyzing volunteering and the underlying motivations has a double
interest. First, volunteering does not seem to be a market oriented be-
haviour in the sense that it is not directly priced, although the economic
theory would suggest a return in terms of wage for a labour supply, given
a corresponding demand. Second, the literature (Table 1) shows that un-
der certain conditions, intrinsic and extrinsic motivations might be at odds
(Lepper, Greene & Nisbett (1973); Deci & Ryan (1985); Frey & Jegan
(2001)) or complementary (Eisenberger, Pierce & Cameron (1999); Gagné
& Deci (2005)). Therefore, the nature of the interaction between the two
types of motivation is important for any policy targeting better perfor-
mance by using external rewards as incentive devices, in particular in sec-
tors where the key motivation making people volunteer is intrinsic. The
cognitive evaluation theory for example (Deci & Ryan (1985), Table 1)
which builds on people’s psychological needs for autonomy and competence
suggests that what matters for intrinsic motivation is the ability to express
own competence and self-control over the outcomes of the performed tasks.
Consequently any external incentive decreasing either the feeling of com-
petence or self-control1 crowds out intrinsic motivation and self-interest in
the activity (Ledford, Gerhart & Fang (2013)). The Attribution or Over-
justification theory (Lepper et al. (1973)) applies in a similar way: when
1Task-contingent or performance contingent rewards such as monetary incentives.
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people are mainly intrinsically motivated for some tasks, external rewards
might induce them to start focusing on the rewards per se at the expense
of their intrinsic motivation or self interest in the activities. Based on these
predictions, whenever intrinsic motivation is predominant in a sector which
benefits from volunteering, a policy, targeting for instance better perfor-
mance or self-interest improvement by providing external incentives, might
be unproductive. In fact, such a policy would be perceived by workers or
volunteers as controlling2 rather than supportive (Eisenberger et al. (1999),
Gagné & Deci (2005)).
Table 1: Motivation crowding-out and crowding-in theories
Theory Key Reference Major Claims Concerning the
Effects of Extrinsic Rewards
Crowding out effect
Cognitive Evaluation Theory (CET) Deci & Ryan (1985)
Under certain conditions,
extrinsic rewards undermine
intrinsic motivation
Attribution Theory/
The Overjustification Effect
Lepper et al. (1973)
Intrinsic motivation
may be decreased
by extrinsic incentives
Motivation Crowding Theory Frey & Jegan (2001)
Intrinsic motivation
can be crowded out by extrinsic
motivation created by incentives
Crowding in effect
Self-Determination Theory (SDT) Gagné & Deci (2005)
Under certain conditions,
extrinsic rewards can enhance
intrinsic motivation
General Interest Theory Eisenberger et al. (1999)
Under certain conditions,
extrinsic rewards can enhance
intrinsic motivation
Source: Ledford, Gerhart & Fang (2013), P.19.
The extent of volunteering can be illustrated both in terms of the money
value of the labour services offered, and in terms of the number of peo-
ple involved in the process, including beneficiaries. For example, around
13.1 millions active Red Cross and Red Crescent volunteers have donated
about 6 billion US dollars worth of services that reached approximately
30 million people in 2009 (IFRC,3 2011). Another way of valuing the
contribution and the value added of volunteers to communities and na-
tional societies takes into account the number of years of unpaid labour
2For instance, some threats of layoff if the assigned objectives are not met.
3International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies Report, 2011.
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they provide yearly. More precisely it consists in mapping the time length
and the different supports (in-kind and financial) allocated by volunteers
to different beneficiaries (non-governmental organizations, faith-based and
community-based organizations). A study conducted in a South African
province (Jansenville, Eastern Cape, about 5612 people) for instance con-
cluded that the before-mentioned indicator amounts to 19 years and 8
months of unpaid labour per year by 4343 people (not necessarily from
the province) and across 278 beneficiary households (Wilkinson-Maposa
(2009)).
Given these different facts, at first glance, volunteering might seem
"irrational" if the immediate or expected benefits (including non-monetary
benefits) likely to be enjoyed, and the underlying costs (opportunity cost
of time) are not clearly evaluated. In this respect, volunteering can be
rationalized only if its motivations (in particular non-monetary motives)
and the related costs incurred are conveniently accounted for.
No matter what drives it, volunteering is observed both in developing
countries (which are poorer with more social ties) and developed countries
(which are richer with less social ties), suggesting that both economic and
non-economic motivations (moral satisfaction, networking, etc.) are in-
volved in the process. In some cases however, one motivation can be more
relevant than the other, depending on what people volunteer for and what
they care more about. People can in fact value more, a direct utility (inter-
nal satisfaction) from volunteering or rather be much more concerned with
an accumulation of work experience and a level of social capital likely to
help in relaxing some general constraints in the labour market. The most
common constraint is the labour market tightness which consists in a sig-
nificant discrepancy between demand and supply for labour, implying an
excess labour supply (Brigden & Thomas (2003)). In the context of very
tight labour market for instance, work experience and valuable networking
could in fact improve a volunteer’s employment prospects and income. If
these external rewards are the key purpose for volunteering, extrinsic moti-
vation would then be leading it. This paper builds on developing countries
data for their contrasting environment: (a) higher unemployment, denser
and stronger family ties to be maintained as compared to industrial soci-
eties (Alesina & Giuliano (2010)) and (b) relatively more risk-averse (Car-
denas & Carpenter (2008)), more generous and altruistic people (Piff et
al. (2012)). These two features are in fact conducive to the observation of
volunteering in similar contexts, for different purposes with room for either
motivation (consumption vs investment) to be predominant.
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: section 2 describes some
key results on different works related to the topic, section 3 shows the
theoretical framework and the identification strategy used, sections 4 and
5 present respectively the data used and the estimation results.
2 Background
Motivation is anything that energizes someone’s behaviour or moves peo-
ple to behave in a specific way. The debate on volunteering motivations
suggests different types of motive to rationalize it, both in economics and
psychology. Most of the studies have in fact attempted to model choices
volunteers make regarding the time allocation and provide an analysis of
the underlying returns (pecuniary or "inner satisfaction"). More specifi-
cally, while psychologists insist on motives that come from within a person
(Fischhoff (1982); Hirst (1988)) as being more informative, economists find
extrinsic motivation, mainly shaped by external incentives more relevant
in explaining human behaviour and argue that people mainly respond to
external incentives (in particular money). In parallel, other studies have
emphasized on how intrinsic motivation could be altered by some external
incentives or rewards and whether people perceive them as controlling or
supportive (Frey (1997); Frey & Jegan (2001); Ledford, Gerhart & Fang
(2013)).
The literature on the motives for volunteering has been synthesized
into two broad categories of motive by Hackl et al. (2007): (a) the intrinsic
motive, accounting for internal satisfaction and considering volunteering as
a consumption good and (b) the extrinsic motive, treating volunteering as
an investment instrument whose returns are the expected external rewards.
Regarding these motives for volunteering, some papers have considered
consumption motive and found that private wealth has a positive effect on
voluntary hours and this in turn positively feeds in people’s altruistic be-
haviour (Schram & Dunsig (1981); Unger (1991); Freeman (1997); Govekar
& Govekar (2002)). More specifically, Meier & Stutzer (2008) compared
volunteers and non-volunteers satisfaction with life and find a robust ev-
idence that the formers feel more satisfied with their life than the latter
using the German Socioeconomic Panel (1985-1999). Similarly, Binder &
Freytag (2013) have concluded using the British Household Panel Survey
(BHPS 2010), that volunteering has a positive impact on subjective well-
being, and this tends to increase over time, the more people volunteer.
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Only few studies discuss volunteering from the perspective of investment
motive or by combining both the investment and the consumption motives
in order to properly isolate the dominant category. The usual goal when
considering the investment model for volunteering is to identify whether
there is a wage premium for people who volunteer. For some authors there
is a significant wage premium of about 4% attributable to volunteering (Day
& Devlin (1997), (1998); Devlin (2000)). However, after restricting the
analysis to managerial tasks, Prouteau & Wolff (2006) find no significant
wage premium using french cross-section data (1998-1999). All of these
studies have though considered volunteering at the aggregate level, that is,
regardless of the heterogeneity in volunteering beneficiary sectors.
The combination of the two motives (investment and consumption) is
included in a couple of studies of which, one seems to be a synthesis. Hackl
et al. (2007) analysis focuses on the two types of motive and finds some
significant evidence of investment motive using an austrian survey data
(collected in 2001) on volunteers in organizations, no matter what organi-
zation it is. They estimate a wage premium of 18.7 % due to volunteering
and highlight the importance of the intensive margin of volunteering in
explaining this premium. The study’s framework is rich for having tested
the two motives simultaneously, but failed to identify any sign of intrinsic
motivation, probably due heterogeneity in beneficiary sectors which is not
accounted for. Moreover, nothing is said about the potential employability
premium4 likely to be associated with volunteering for investment purposes
by unemployed people.
Following the previous discussion, it is important to emphasize the role
of incentives since it complexifies the distinction between altruistic pro-
social behaviours and the constrained ones. In that respect, Bénabou &
Tirole (2003, 2006) point out that when honor and/or stigma are the main
reputational concern in a society, extrinsic incentives (rewards and punish-
ment) might crowd out some altruistic pro-social behaviours. Elaborating
more on the issue of incentives, Seabright (2009) identifies two types of
discontinuity regarding an altruistic behaviour. The first type of disconti-
nuity relates to the fact that for an altruist, it is more worthwhile to offer
the service for free than getting a payment as reward. The second arises
from the fact people find it less worthwhile selling the services for a posi-
tive amount of money, although they are ready to provide the service for
free. These different dynamics, in particular the latter, are accounted for
4Difference in the probability to get employed between volunteers and
non-volunteers.
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in different theories exhibited in Table 1 and discussed in this paper’s re-
sults. An empirical implementation of the effects of incentives is conducted
by Carpenter & Myers (2010). They have implemented an experiment in
a context where people could volunteer to be a firefighter. The authors
conclude that altruism and reputational concerns are key in the decision to
volunteer and are positively correlated with it. However, this effect seems
to disappear when there are some variations in stipends incentives (external
rewards).
All of these models are designed to explain in a sense the main reasons
why people volunteer. However, the literature lacks large scale studies
involving an analysis on volunteering motives with a focus on the different
beneficiary sectors of volunteering, considered separately. This is important
since the dynamic of volunteering and its implications might differ from one
volunteering sector to the other. Failing to take this into account may lead
to spurious general conclusions, that is, conclusions not applicable to most
sectors.
3 Theoretical framework and Identification
This section shows the theoretical setting for the analysis and describes the
identification strategy. It does not provide a formal derivation of volun-
teering dynamics but induces some interesting insights and intuitions for
the identification framework.
3.1 Theoretical framework
The framework describes two simple consumption and investment models
and their implications in terms of volunteering.
3.1.1 Consumption model
Consider an individual whose preferences consist in a linear combination
of selfishness and moral attitudes with the weight attributed to morality
being the degree of morality.5
5The extent to which she believes she has to do the right thing in a given situation,
see Alger, I. & J., W., Weibull (2013) for more details.
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The typical individual solves the following problem:
max
τl,τv ,G
U(τl, τv, G)
Subject to G = w(Γ − τl − τv)
where τv is the time devoted to voluntary activities, τl the time allocated
to leisure, G the consumption of usual goods and services, Γ the total
time endowment during a given period (with Γ < ∞) and w the wage
per unit of time. The consumption model for volunteering is assumed here
equivalent to the basic consumer’s program. Volunteering is then included
in the program like any normal consumption good as an argument of a
utility function U(τl, τv, G), assumed concave and strictly increasing in each
argument (Ux > 0, for x ∈ {τl, τv, G}). This utility is maximized under
the budget and time constraint G = w(Γ − τl − τv). The key assumption
here is that the consumer is not a pure homo economicus as regards her
consumption of volunteering. This means that her degree of morality is
non-zero and if intrinsic motivation is the main driver of volunteering, then
τv should be non-zero too, irrespective of how much the opportunity cost
of time amounts to. From this simple framework described, the following
conjecture can be analyzed:
Claim: If intrinsic motivation is the main driver of volunteering, then vol-
unteering should induce a welfare premium at the cost of less time available
for paid activities. Moreover, the willingness to volunteer should not be de-
creasing in income nor should it vary across employment status (employed
versus unemployed).
A volunteer in this case does not in fact expect any external benefit
apart from the enjoyment of the activity she volunteers for. In that sense,
becoming poorer or richer should not affect the willingness to volunteer if
intrinsic motivation is the main reason for this behaviour. Moreover the
welfare premium from volunteering if any, should not significantly differ by
empoyment status. That is, being employed should not bring any bonus to
the welfare premium derived from volunteering as compared to unemployed
people. Conversely, the volunteer might mainly care about the external
benefits she is likely to enjoy from volunteering. This case is treated in the
investment model.
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3.1.2 Investment model
The idea behind the investment model is that an individual volunteers
because she expects an external rewards, mainly, an accumulation of human
capital, some experience and an extension of her networkings in order to
relax labour market tightness constraint. In other words, the volunteer
anticipates that the experience and the network she could potentially build
during the voluntary activities would allow her to get better job prospects
(in particular if she previously has no job or has a precarious one).
The following simple dynamic investment model can illustrate the op-
timal trajectory of volunteering and serves as a baseline to test extrinsic
motive (Cahuc, Carcillo & Zylberger (2014), Hackl et al. (2007)). Volun-
teering for an individual in this context consists in behaving as a pure homo
economicus agent caring mainly for her own payoffs.
Consider a basic optimization framework in which an individual maxi-
mizes her (lifetime working period) net present income:
max
v(τ), t(τ)
∫ Γ
0
f(v(τ), s(τ), t(τ))e−rτ dτ
Subject to s˙(τ) = g(v(τ))− ςs(τ)
v(τ) ≤ Γ − t(τ)− l(τ)
and v(τ) <∞;Γ <∞.
with Γ the total amount of time endowment, l(τ) and t(τ) the time length
allocated respectively to leisure and to paid jobs and ς the volunteer’s
depreciation rate for human and social capital (s) at period τ . The depre-
ciation of human and social capital (s) at each period τ is mainly due to
skill depletion and some social links (or ties) breaking off especially dur-
ing inactive periods. In this framework f(·) is the individual production
function which can be seen as an income generating process, v(τ) stands
for volunteering amount of time at instant τ and g is the gross gain in
terms of know-how, human capital and the networking thanks to volun-
teering. The income generating process f works as follows: volunteering at
period τ decreases the contemporaneous marketable production or income
from paid work (fv < 0), it increases the unpaid labour services (v) and
boosts thereby the stock of human and social capital (gv > 0) which in turn
induces a positive marginal return tomorrow (fs > 0 at τ + 1 or at a sub-
sequent optimal τ ∗ > τ). These external benefits are not only employment
status improving (especially moving from unemployment to employment)
9
but they also offer prospects for higher income and eventually less scope
for volunteering. Thus a rational agent will engage in an optimal voluntary
activity path if and only if the expected returns from volunteering outweigh
the losses incurred in current income due to volunteering, else vτ = 0.
As shown in Hackl et al. (2007) the optimal trajectory of v(τ), the
solution to the previous dynamic problem is hump shaped (Figure 1).
Figure 1: Optimal trajectory v∗
v
s
v∗
s∗
In fact people with a low s and employment prospects would tend to vol-
unteer more up to an optimal threshold, then they will be less likely to vol-
unteer in particular because they would already have a significantly high
s and probably a new or a better job. Since volunteering in this model
is expected to increase human capital, networking and experience, it has
to be the case that it increases the prospects for moving from unemploy-
ment to employment. In that respect, the following supposition could be
consistently suggested about the investment motive identification.
Claim: Volunteering at time τ increases the likelihood of getting employed
at time τ +1 or at a time τ ∗ > τ , and this impact tends to vanish when the
individual becomes richer or switches from unemployment to employment.
3.2 Identification strategy
Following the previous discussion, the identification strategy is based on
the two theoretical frameworks presented and the underlying suppositions.
More specifically, the different hypotheses below are derived and serve as
the basis of the identification of the key motive in each sector.
Hypothesis 1: Intrinsic motivation for volunteering is salient
Volunteering significantly increases people’s well-being, and this welfare
premium is independent from employment status.
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Hypothesis 2: Extrinsic motivation for volunteering is salient
There is a welfare premium related to volunteering and this premium sig-
nificantly varies by employment status. Moreover volunteering increases
the likelihood of moving from unemployment to employment.
Hypothesis 3: No salience identified
There is no significant welfare premium from volunteering. That is, neither
Hypothesis 1 nor Hypothesis 2 hold true. This might happen depending on
how the two motives interact in the considered beneficiary sector (crowding-
out versus crowding in effects as shown in Table 1).
Although testing these interactions is beyond the scope of this work, if
none of the motives appears to be dominant, then there are two possible
suggestions:
• First, a crowding-out effect from extrinsic motivation if any cannot
be strong enough to outweigh intrinsic motivation in the considered
sector. The volunteer is as concerned with inner satisfaction as she
is with rewards and external returns on time invested.
• Second, one might suggest a crowding-in effect via a self-reinforcing
mechanism from the two types of motive.
The different hypotheses are tested using the following estimations in a
two-step framework :
Step 1: Is consumption motive salient?
Wellbeingi = β1V olunteeringi + β2Educationi + β3Employmenti
+β4Employmenti ∗ V olunteeringi
+δ′controlsi + countryfe+ ξi (1)
controls = {education, gender, marital status, age, health}
As explained in the identification strategy the parameters of interest are β1
and β4. If the welfare premium (β1) is non-zero and does not statistically differ
between employed and unemployed, the consumption motive is key for volunteer-
ing in the considered sector. Conversely, when the welfare premium significantly
differs between employed and unemployed, there is scope for investment motive
salience. Then to confirm whether this is actually the case or not, a second step
is required.
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Step 2: Is investment motive dominant ?
Employmentit+1 =θ1V olunteerit + θ2Ageit+1 + θ3V olunteerit ∗Ageit+1
+ θ4Educationit+1 + θ7Healthit+1 + θ7Genderi (2)
+ countryfe+ ςit+1
Equation (1) is estimated by a generalized ordered logit to account for propor-
tional odds or parallel regression assumption which is taken as given in the simple
ordered logit but quite often violated. Equation (2) is estimated via a simple
logit. In both cases the different predicted probabilities for each outcome are
computed.
In practice, the identification of the predominant motive (consumption versus
investment motive) in a given beneficiary sector of volunteering proceeds as
follows in a joint hypotheses testing framework:
• From step 1, if β1 6= 0 and β4 = 0, then consumption motive (or intrinsic
motivation) is dominant.
• If from steps 1 and 2 (β1 6= 0 & β4 6= 0) & (θ1 6= 0 or θ3 6= 0), then
investment motive is more likely to be dominant in the considered sector.
• else, one cannot conclude on a salience of either motive.
The different variables used and the database are described in next section.
4 Data
The empirical analysis of this study is based on the World Values Survey, here-
after (WVS) database.6 It is an individual level survey conducted in about 100
developed and developing countries. This paper focuses on developing countries
(Figure 2) and on the time period 1999-2003.
The main variables of interest include Volunteering in various forms (dif-
ferent beneficiary sectors), some subjective measures of Well-being (Satisfaction
with one’s life and Feeling of happiness) and other individual socio-economic
characteristics: age, education level, gender, health status, marital status.
Regarding the variable Volunteering, data are collected in all of the benefi-
ciary sectors (see Table 2 for the considered sectors) by asking respondents to
evaluate a statement for which the possible responses are coded as 1=belongs
to and 0=no. For instance, the following statement: "Voluntary work: unpaid
work, social welfare service for elderly, handicapped or deprived people" is the
one related to whether or not a respondent volunteers for social welfare services
offered to the elderly people.
6Available at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp.
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Table 2: Summary statistics on the key variables
Mean SD Min Max
Basic characteristics
Age 39.5 15.1 15 96
Health Status (Very poor- Very good) 3.87 0.87 1 5
Happiness (Low-High) 2.08 0.69 1 3
Satisfaction (Low-High) 2.11 0.74 1 3
Education (Low-High) 1.89 0.72 1 3
Employed (No/Yes) 0.52 0.50 0 1
Volunteering types (No/Yes)
Social welfare (Elderly/Disabled) 0.11 0.31 0 1
Religious or church organization 0.20 0.40 0 1
Education/arts/music/cultural activities 0.093 0.29 0 1
Political parties or groups 0.075 0.26 0 1
Youth work 0.063 0.24 0 1
Women’s group 0.11 0.31 0 1
Peace movement 0.055 0.23 0 1
Health organization 0.073 0.26 0 1
N 16105
Source: Author’s calculations based on World Values Survey database.
Furthermore, Table 2 provides the average proportion of volunteers by bene-
ficiary sector for the considered period. Information on well-being is captured by
the variables Feeling of happiness and Satisfaction with one’s life. The statement
facing the respondents in evaluating their level of Satisfaction is: "All things con-
sidered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days? Please use
this card to help with your answer". The response card is a three scale choices
ranging from 1=Dissatisfied (Lowest level) to 3= Very satisfied (Highest level).
Similarly, the same process is used to evaluate Happiness using the following
statement: "Taking all things together, would you say you are: 1=Not at all
happy (lowest level) to 3 =Very happy (Highest level)?".
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Figure 2: Measures of Well-being
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The two proxies for well-being, happiness and satisfaction are positively as-
sociated and most of the countries considered are quite close to the 45 degree
line (Figure 2). Although on average people tend to report slightly lower level of
satisfaction, both measures should give consistent results regarding the question
addressed in this paper. However, it is argued that in most cases, happiness
should be preferred since it allows to capture people’s ultimate objective or in-
terest (Veenhoven (2012), Ng (2015)).
5 Results and discussion
The estimation results of equation (1) are reported in Tables 3 and 4. The results
from equation (2) are reported in Table 5 (see the annexes).
Two types of information are used from those tables:
(i) The marginal effects on the probability to claim a given level of well-being
(mainly Happiness) conditional on volunteering summarized in Tables 3 and 4.
Note that these tables also include the interaction effects of volunteering and
employment status on well-being in order to evaluate whether there is scope for
investment motive to be dominant.
(ii) The predicted probabilities to get a job during the time period 2000-2003
given volunteering at the start of the period (Table 5, Panel A). Moreover, the
differential effects across age cohorts in terms of difference-in-differences (Diff-
in-Diff hereafter) of the predicted probabilities are provided in Panel B, Table 5.
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They allow to evaluate the employability premium related to volunteering and
how it varies across age cohorts and beneficiary sectors.
Using these two points combined with the identification strategy described in
section 3, a conclusion is drawn on the type of motivation more likely to be
salient in each considered beneficiary sector and the implications.
The following discussion starts with the beneficiary sectors where the con-
sumption motive is more likely to be dominant, and proceeds with the investment
motive sectors. The last point includes organizations where none of the motive
is identified as dominant.
5.1 Consumption motive
From the results provided in Table 3, people seem relatively more likely to vol-
unteer for consumption motive in two sectors: Women’s groups and Peace move-
ments (columns (6) and (7)). The former beneficiary sector consists in women’s
associations with the purpose of defending their own rights and fight for more
equality between men and women. The latter includes organizations seeking to
achieve ideals like ending wars and violence in the world. In both sectors, there
is a welfare premium from volunteering and it does not vary with employment
status (columns (6) and (7) of Table 3). In Women’s groups for instance a vol-
unteer is 3.3 percentage points more likely to evaluate her happiness as high and
relatively less as low or medium than would do her counterpart who does not
volunteer there.7 Similarly, in peace movements, a volunteer is on average more
likely (6 percentage points) to rank her well-being as medium and relatively less
likely to rank it as low. Given that in the two cases, these rankings hold no
matter the volunteer’s employment status (interaction effect not significant), it
is sufficient to conclude that consumption motive is on average the key motiva-
tion for volunteering in the two sectors. In other words, people volunteering in
Women’s groups and Peace movements seem on average much more concerned
about the sheer joy of being member of the groups and taking part to the activ-
ities (more intrinsically motivated) than seeking for experience and networking
for better job prospects (investment motive). Note that these results are iden-
tical to the predictions using satisfaction as a measure of well-being (Table 4).
In such a context and given the different theories shown in Table 1, two types
of implication might arise in those sectors in the presence of extrinsic incen-
tives for volunteering: either (a) an undermining of intrinsic motivation by any
attempt to extrinsically motivate volunteers, for example by using money as re-
ward (Cognitive evaluation, Over-justification, Motivation crowding theories) or
on the contrary, (b) its enhancement (self determination theory, general interest
theory). Everything will depend on the nature of the different specific condi-
7These results hold at 10% significance level.
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tions under which in each beneficiary sector, one or the other scenario occurs.
However, an analysis of the different conditions conducive to a crowding-out or
a crowding-in of intrinsic motivation in the different beneficiary sectors under
study are out of the scope of this paper and left for future research.
There are three other beneficiary sectors where there is a welfare premium
related to volunteering: Social Welfare for the elderly or deprived persons, Re-
ligious and Church Organizations and Health Organizations (Table 3, columns
(1), (2) and (8)). Volunteers in those sectors are in fact on average relatively
less likely to rank their level of happiness as low or even medium as compared
to non-volunteers. In religious and church organizations for example, people in-
volved in volunteer activities are 10 percentage points more likely to feel strongly
happier than their counterpart who are not. However this welfare premium re-
lated to volunteering significantly differs by employment status. For those three
beneficiary sectors, people do not seem to engage in volunteering mainly for
intrinsic motive or consumption purposes. People who are not employed tend
in fact to report more often a relatively higher level of happiness (interaction
terms in columns (1), (2) and (8), Table 3), that is, they would report a rela-
tively higher welfare premium from volunteering than people who already have a
job. Obviously there is scope for investment motive to be the leading reason for
volunteering in the three cases since the opportunity cost of time that matters
mainly for investment motive actually seems to translate into a relatively higher
welfare cost for employed people as compared to the unemployed.
As presented in the identification strategy, further analysis is required for
each of the three beneficiary sectors in order to figure out whether it is rewarding
or not that volunteering is mainly led by investment motive.
5.2 Investment motive
As sketched in the previous section, the three beneficiary sectors where invest-
ment motive is more likely to be the leading motive are: social welfare for the
elderly or deprived people, religious and church organizations and health organi-
zations (Table 3). There are though two questions to be addressed in analyzing
those beneficiary sectors from the perspective of investment motive: (a) does it
on average make any difference in terms of job prospects to volunteer in either of
the sectors and (b) how does it matter across age cohorts to volunteer for better
job prospects? To the first question, the answer is yes for two beneficiary sectors:
social welfare for the elderly or deprived people and health organizations (Ta-
ble 5, Panel A, columns (1) and (8)). It is not the case for religious and church
organizations (column (2)) where there is on average no significant difference in
terms of job prospects between volunteers and non-volunteers. However, regard-
ing the second question, there are some significant differences by age classes not
only in that beneficiary sector but also in health organizations (Table 5, Panel B,
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columns (2) and (8)). These differences can be observed in particular for people
aged between 45-54 or above 65 years.
Figure 3: Diff-in-Diff across age cohorts for religious organizations
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Source: Author’s estimations based on World Values Survey database.
Figure 3 shows that for the elderly (+ 65 years old), the difference in probabili-
ties to get a job between volunteers and non-volunteers in religious and church
organizations is larger than in the youngest group (aged 15-24). In other words,
for the +65 years old, volunteering in religious and church organizations for in-
vestment purposes seems relatively more rewarding as compared to the youngest
group. This is mainly related to the fact that most of the people aged +65 years
are retired, need to be active and to keep good connections with people in order
not to feel useless to the society and these returns to volunteering significantly
make them better off (Morrow-Howell et al. (2003)). In this respect, any sec-
tor likely to generate those returns are good candidate for them, except for the
youngest. The +65 would thus tend to target sectors with less competition
and requiring more life experience and general knowledge, in particular, if the
experience accumulated over the course of their working period happens to be
irrelevant. They are then relatively more attractive for such sectors compared
to the youngest, and it is likely to be the case in religious and church organiza-
tions. On the youngest people side, the fact that there is a relative immobility
of skills and workers across religious and church organizations, due to differ-
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ences in religious practices, in faith and thereby, in the way the different tasks
are executed, is deterrent. In fact, some valuable skills and capacity built in
one religious organization might be useless or inappropriate in another organiza-
tion (Bauder (2005), O’sullivan (2009), Kelly (2011)). The elderly people would
be less concerned about this than would be the younger ones. Therefore, the
younger someone is, the less likely she is to significantly benefit from an invest-
ment in religious and church organizations for better job prospects as compared
to the elderly people.
The other significant result for religious and church organizations (Figure 3)
simply reflects that it is relatively more costly for the 45-54 years old to volunteer
in religious and church organizations for the sake of a new job or for better job
perspectives than it is for the youngest people (15-24). As shown in Panel A of
Table 5 (column (2)) the 45-54 years old people are significantly more able on
average to find a job than the youngest group, regardless of volunteering. So
for them in fact, it is relatively less valuable to volunteer in religious and church
organization for investment purposes than it would be for the 15-24 due to the
characteristics of the sector exposed above (relative immobility of labor and skills
for instance) which are more harmful (induce higher opportunity costs) for the
45-54 years old than for the 15-24 old.
There is no significant differences across age classes in terms of employability
induced by volunteering for social welfare to the elderly persons. It might happen
if for example volunteering is mainly directed to grandparents and takes the form
of exchange for services where the volunteer (their child) provides them with
some financial support or healthcare and in turn expects them to take care of
some domestic chores, childcare, etc. (Wu & Li (2014)). The volunteer will in
fact in such a context have relatively more time and energy at disposal for a new
or a better job search. This holds irrespective of the volunteer’s age. Similarly,
in the case that extrinsic motive is exclusively guided by investment in know-how
and networking, the returns in terms of employability do not significantly differ
by age cohorts for social welfare to the elderly.
Finally, the results for health organizations (column (8)) and for religious
and church organizations (column (8)) are similar except that the employability
premium induced by volunteering in health organizations is significant only for
the +65 years old people. The main explanation to this is work experience often
required for health related activities.
The following section focuses on beneficiary sectors showing no salience of
either motive.
5.3 Other beneficiary sectors
There are three sectors for which neither intrinsic motive nor investment motive
is identified to be the predominant motive for volunteering in this paper. Those
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beneficiary sectors include art, music or cultural activities, political parties and
human rights. Therefore, on average, people volunteering in those sectors are as
likely to be concerned with enjoying per se the tasks performed in the framework
of their voluntary activities, as the experience or the better job prospects and
opportunities volunteering provides them with. In this case, the two types of
motive are likely to be self-reinforcing. However this observation needs further
investigations.
6 Conclusion
This paper primarily contributes to the literature on volunteering and the un-
derlying motives by considering the major beneficiary sectors separately and
by identifying volunteers’ predominant motivation (intrinsic versus extrinsic).
The interest of this contribution is twofold: (a) it emphasizes the necessity to
disaggregate volunteering in different beneficiary sectors for an analysis on the
motives and (b) it implies that a knowledge on the leading motivation in each
beneficiary sector is key for any policy aiming at improving productivity or the
volunteers’ endeavor, given the risk of a crowding-out of intrinsic motivation and
self-interest.
The methodology is built on a simple model of consumption and invest-
ment and provides an empirical framework that compares volunteers and non-
volunteers in different dimensions, controlling for their main socio economic-
characteristics. These dimensions include well-being, employment and age co-
horts.
The analysis results in two main findings. First, in peace movements and in
women’s groups and associations, volunteers seem mainly intrinsically motivated
rather than seeking for investment in experience and networking for better job
prospects. Therefore for those sectors, providing some extrinsic rewards (positive
or negative) seeking for example for better performance or higher returns might
not be worthwhile, in particular if these rewards are perceived as controlling or
undermining autonomy. Second, for sectors concerned with social welfare for
the elderly people and in religious and health organizations, the key motivation
for volunteering is investment and the underlying returns (extrinsic returns). In
this case, volunteers are more likely to positively respond to extrinsic incentives.
Future research projects on the topic might focus on the conditions under which,
a crowding-out effect occurs in the presence of extrinsic incentives in sectors
where people are mainly intrinsically motived to volunteer, and to which extent
a crowding-in effect would happen in such sectors, accounting for the intensive
margin of volunteering.
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ANNEXES
Table 3: First step analysis: Consumption motive and potential extrinsic motive using Happiness
Panel A of beneficiary sectors
HAPPINESS[=Low-Medium-High]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare:
Elderly/Disabled
Religious
and church
organization
Education
Art/Music
Political
parties
or groups
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
employed -0.0017 0.023∗∗ -0.021∗∗ -0.010 0.029∗∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.0015 0.030∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗ -0.0052 0.033∗∗∗ -0.028∗∗∗
volunteer -0.066∗∗∗ -0.019∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ -0.032∗∗∗ -0.071∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.019 -0.0054 0.024 -0.023 -0.0065 0.030
empl_vol 0.0078 0.085∗∗∗ -0.093∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗ 0.0097∗∗ -0.045∗∗ -0.024 0.043∗ -0.019 0.025 0.0070 -0.032
N 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105
Source: WVS database.
Panel B of beneficiary sectors
HAPPINESS[=Low-Medium-High]
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Human
right
Women
groups
Peace
Movement
Health
Organization
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
employed -0.0040 0.033∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.0042 0.033∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.0034 0.032∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗ -0.0031 0.028∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗
volunteer -0.026 -0.0073 0.033 -0.026∗ -0.0072∗ 0.033∗ -0.083∗∗∗ 0.060∗∗ 0.023 -0.044∗∗∗ -0.012∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
empl*vol 0.0043 0.0012 -0.0055 0.0053 0.0015 -0.0069 0.023 0.0065 -0.030 0.0047 0.078∗∗∗ -0.083∗∗∗
N 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105
Source: WVS database.
Note: The coefficients reported in both panels are the marginal effects on the probability of having either level of Happiness conditional on volunteering and some controls.
The dependent variable (Happiness) has three categories: Low, Medium and High. In each column volunteering is characterized by the considered beneficiary sector
(2nd row in the heading). For example column (1) reports the effects of volunteering for Social welfare on the probability of being in either category of happiness, the
effect of employment and the interaction effect of volunteering and employment status. The control variables used are: education level, health status, gender, marital status
and age. Their effects are in the expected direction and not reported for presentation purposes. The country fixed effects are also controlled for and the significance levels
considered are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 4: First step analysis: Consumption motive and potential extrinsic motive using Satisfaction
Panel A of beneficiary sectors
SATISFACTION[=Low-Medium-High]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Social welfare:
Elderly/Disabled
Religious
and church
organization
Education
Art/Music
Political
parties
or groups
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
employed -0.024∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.0049 -0.019∗∗∗ -0.0054∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ -0.024∗∗∗ 0.012 0.012 -0.023∗∗∗ 0.012 0.012
volunter -0.12∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.024 0.016 -0.052∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗ -0.017 -0.0048 0.022 -0.014 0.042∗∗ -0.028
empl_vol 0.035 -0.094∗∗∗ 0.059∗ 0.013 0.0038 -0.017 -0.014 -0.0040 0.018 -0.021 -0.0059 0.027
N 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105
Source: WVS database.
Panel B of beneficiary sectors
SATISFACTION[=Low-Medium-High]
(5) (6) (7) (8)
Human
right
Women
groups
Peace
Movement
Health
Organization
Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High Low Medium High
employed -0.016∗∗ -0.0044∗∗ 0.020∗∗ -0.027∗∗∗ 0.015 0.013 -0.026∗∗∗ 0.015 0.011 -0.018∗∗∗ -0.0050∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
volunteer -0.018 -0.0050 0.023 -0.046∗∗ 0.030∗ 0.017 -0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.0091 -0.063∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗ 0.020
empl_vol -0.050 0.048 0.0025 0.0041 0.0012 -0.0052 0.041 -0.084∗ 0.043 0.026 0.0072 -0.033
N 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105 16105
Source: WVS database.
Note: The coefficients reported in both panels are the marginal effects on the probability of having either level of Satisfaction conditional on volunteering and some
controls. The dependent variable (Satisfaction) has three categories: Low, Medium and High. In each column volunteering is characterized by the considered
beneficiary sector (2nd row in the headings). For example column (1) reports the effects of volunteering for Social welfare on the probability of being in either
category of Satisfaction, the effect of employment and the interaction effect of volunteering and employment status. The control variables used are: education level,
health status, gender, marital status and age. Their effects are in the expected direction and not reported for presentation purposes. The country fixed effects are also
controlled for and the significance levels considered are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 5: Second step analysis: Investment motive and comparative effects by age
Panel A: Effects of volunteering on employment by beneficiary sector
Predicted Pr(Employed=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social welfare:
Elderly
Disabled
Religious
and church
organization
Education
Art/Music
Political
parties
or groups
Human
right
Women
groups
Peace
Mov.
Health
Organization
Volunteer 0.081** 0.007 0.010 -0.017 0.006 -0.012 0.034* 0.029*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
[25− 34]vs[15− 24] 0.308** 0.311** 0.308** 0.310** 0.306** 0.307** 0.310** 0.311**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[35− 44]vs[15− 24] 0.400** 0.404** 0.402** 0.405** 0.399** 0.400** 0.404** 0.404**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[45− 54]vs[15− 24] 0.373** 0.376** 0.374** 0.376** 0.371** 0.372** 0.376** 0.377**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
[55− 64]vs[15− 24] 0.101** 0.105** 0.104** 0.104** 0.105** 0.104** 0.106** 0.105**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
[65 plus]vs[15− 24] -0.154** -0.150** -0.146** -0.151** -0.147** -0.149** -0.146** -0.147**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910
Source: WVS database
** p<0.01, * p<0.05
Panel B: Differential effects of volunteering on employment by age categories
Predicted Pr(Employed=1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social welfare:
Elderly
Disabled
Religious
and church
organization
Education
Art/Music
Political
parties
or groups
Human
right
Women
groups
Peace
Mov.
Health
Organization
[25− 34]vs[15− 24]#Volunteer -0.013 -0.020 0.056 -0.060 0.006 0.032 -0.010 0.045
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
[35− 44]vs[15− 24]#Volunteer -0.051 -0.028 0.083* -0.051 0.082 0.064 -0.015 0.063
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
[45− 54]vs[15− 24]#Volunteer -0.083 -0.071* 0.084 -0.041 0.086 0.075 -0.024 0.050
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05)
[55− 64]vs[15− 24]#Volunteer -0.045 0.029 0.139* 0.033 0.245** 0.141* 0.053 0.108
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
[65 plus]vs[15− 24]#Volunteer 0.019 0.073* 0.202** 0.012 0.259** 0.143* 0.127 0.143*
(0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910 13910
Source: Author’s estimations based on World Values Survey database.
Standard Errors in parenthesis.
Notes:
1 In Panel A, the coefficients reported are the predicted probabilities of getting a job during the time period 2000-2003 given volunteering
at the start of the period in a given beneficiary sector.
2 Panel B reports the differences in the predicted probabilities of getting a job when one volunteers and compares it across age cohorts.
3 In both panels the following variables are controlled for: education level, health status, gender, marital status, the different age classes
and the country fixed effects. The significance levels considered are ** p<0.01, * p<0.05.
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